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The increasing differentiation on the supply side of agricultural and horticultural 
markets has resulted in many governance structure changes between growers and wholesalers. 
For example, marketing cooperatives are restructured, heterogeneous associations split up in 
various one-product associations, growers integrate forward into wholesaling, and so on. 
These developments are analysed with an incomplete contracting model addressing horizontal 
as well as vertical relationships in a multilateral setting. The interactions between authority, 
access, and countervailing power in the choice of governance structure are highlighted. 
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‘If the world fails to meet its food demands in the next half-century, the failure will be at least 
as much in the area of institutional innovation as in the area of technical change.’                          




This article is about the relationship between institutional innovation (by way of 
governance structure changes) and changing food demands. In the agrifood sector there is a 
trend towards differentiation and innovation. Consumers demand more variety and higher 
quality; producers respond to intensified competition from globalisation and saturated markets 
by developing and marketing a broader range of new products. This trend has implications for 
the organisation of grower – wholesaler relationships. Wholesalers who used to purchase at 
the auction now contract directly with growers, and growers have established new 
organisations to bargain with wholesalers or retailers (Bijman, 2002). There are even cases of 
forward integration into wholesaling.  
Important governance structures in the agrifood industry are the producer co-
operative
2 and the growers’ association. A producer cooperative is an association of many 
independent growers (horizontal relationship) who jointly own a downstream processor / 
retailer (vertical relationship). An association is the same as a producer co-operative, except 
for the vertical relationship. These (collective ownership) governance structures are not listed 
on stock markets, and have distinguishing features (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2001, p12) like ‘an orientation to provide benefits to members and satisfy their 
needs, democratic goal setting and decision-making methods, special rules for dealing with 
capital and profit, and general interest objectives (in some cases)’. A number of these features 
of collective ownership will be at the centre of the analysis. 
Collective ownership among many growers requires a method for collective decision-
making. Most commonly a democratic decision-making procedure of some sort is employed. 
Votes in cooperatives and associations are usually weighted by volume of patronage, although 
some cooperatives adhere to a one-member-one-vote scheme. A problem with these collective 
decision-making procedures is that they may yield decisions that are (collectively) inefficient 
in the sense that they do not maximize aggregate grower surplus (Hart and Moore, 1996). It 
entails that voting power is to a certain extent allocated independent of quantity and / or 
quality. A similar observation holds for the feature ‘special rules for dealing with capital and 
profit’. An example of the special rules for dealing with capital and profit is that most 
cooperatives and associations use a ‘pooling arrangement in which members share equitably 
on a per-unit basis in the revenue stream that has been created’ (Cook and Iliopoulos, 1999, 
p526). This article will refer to such a pooling arrangement as the equality principle regarding 
the distribution of revenues and in the delivery of output. The equality principle regarding the 
distribution of revenues entails that each member receives the same remuneration for a unit of 
output that is sold, regardless the quality of the product. If a grower does not produce, then no 
remuneration is received. The equality principle regarding the delivery of output entails that a 
certain quantity of customer demand is met by proportionally delivering from the output of 
each grower, regardless the quality. The observation regarding the equality principle is, like 
the observation regarding collective decision making procedures, that revenues and costs are 
to a certain extent allocated independent of quantity and / or quality. 
The trend towards differentiation and innovation in  agricultural and horticultural 
markets  entails an increasing heterogeneity of growers. This poses a challenge for  the 
traditional grower organizations like cooperatives and associations because various aspects of 
these governance structures are tailored towards homogeneous members (Hansmann, 1996). 
Collective decision making procedures and pooling arrangements are less likely to b e 
                                                 
2 The labels marketing cooperative and agricultural cooperative are also used.   3 
inefficient in a situation with homogeneous rather than heterogeneous membership. However, 
highly innovative growers demand, or require, a different treatment than the less innovative 
growers. Increasing heterogeneity seems therefore to undermine the efficiency, and therefore 
the stability, of cooperatives and associations because it creates tensions between innovative 
and less innovative growers. The organizational response may be twofold. First, they may 
restructure internally in order to address the increasing heterogeneity (Cook, 1995). Examples 
are the introduction of transferable equity shares, appreciable equity shares, and minimum up-
front equity investment in order to deal with the free rider problem, the portfolio problem, the 
horizon problem, the control problem, and the influence problem. Second, different 
governance structures may have to be adopted in order to deal effectively and efficiently with 
the increasing heterogeneity (Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002). Examples are the emergence of 
grower associations, moving decision power closer to the final product markets, and forward 
integration. This article focuses on the second response, but it is not entirely silent on the first. 
The reason is that both responses are aspects of a governance structure.  
A governance structure has to specify the means of motivating individuals, i.e. 
delineating incentives, and to specify how decisions are made, i.e. the allocation of authority.
3 
The former will be reflected in the allocation of costs and payment schemes. A prominent 
example in cooperatives and associations is the above equality principle, and nowadays the 
design of member benefit programs. This is the realm of complete contracting theory in the 
form of agency relationships. The working hypothesis is that everything that is known, can 
and will be incorporated in the design of optimal remuneration schemes. The main issues 
regarding the allocation of authority are (de)centralization of decision rights and ownership in 
the form of property rights.
4 This is the main topic of the theory of incomplete contracts.
5 The 
allocation of authority serves the role of completing the incompleteness of contracts. It is 
complementary to complete contracting theory because the focus is on allocating authority in 
situations not covered by formal contracts. 
The theory of the firm is mostly concerned with the bilateral relationship between one 
seller and one buyer. However, multilateral relationships are more realistic. A multilateral 
setting consisting of two sellers and one buyer is presented in this paper. This allows an 
analysis regarding the effect of differentiation and innovation in horizontal as well as vertical 
relationships on the choice of governance structure. The interactions between authority, self-
selection, countervailing power, and access in the choice of governance structure are 
highlighted. Authority entails the power to decide / selectively intervene in unforeseen 
circumstances. Self-selection means that growers with high quality organise themselves in an 
independent association, leaving the growers with low quality behind. This is attractive for 
high quality growers because they are now able to appropriate the full benefits of their 
additional effort. However, a disadvantage of the (small) specialised growers’ association is 
that it has less countervailing power compared to a marketing co-operative combining several 
different growers.  Countervailing power entails that the wholesaler cannot deal with the 
growers separately. Direct access (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) at the retail stage of production 
is also an important concern for growers. Forward integration by growers into wholesaling 
establishes direct access. However, this may undermine the investment incentives for 
wholesalers.  
                                                 
3 Hansmann (1996) uses the terms income and decision rights.  
4 Property rights are fundamental: entrepreneurs will not invest if they expect to be unable to keep the 
fruits of their investment. The empirical study by Johnson, e.a. (2002, p 1336) concludes ‘… secure 
property rights are both necessary and sufficient to induce investment by entrepreneurs.’. Weak 
property rights discourage firms from investing their profits, even when bank loans are available. 
5 There are various reasons for the incompleteness of contracts, like limited cognitive capacities 
preventing to foresee all possible contingencies, the costs of writing complete contracts, the 
impreciseness of language, and the limitations of the judicial system in verifying all observable 
information.   4 
The interactions between authority, access, and countervailing power in the choice of 
governance structure are analysed from an incomplete contracting perspective (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986 and Hart and Moore, 1990). The model consists of two upstream parties, offering 
produce of different quality in excess supply to one downstream party in a situation with 
certainty.
6 
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The incentive to 
invest is determined for each party in each governance structure in section 3. Section 4 
addresses the equilibrium choice of governance structure. Comparative statics results are 




The interplay between authority, access, and countervailing power in the choice of 
governance structure is analysed with a model consisting of three parties: grower 1 producing 
high quality A, grower 2 producing low quality B (<A), and a wholesaler. Figure 1 presents 
these three parties. The top-left box of each governance structure is grower 1, while the top-










Figure 1: The three parties 
 
Figure 2 distinguishes eight governance structures. The distinction between a producer 
and a consumer cooperative is that the former is forward integrated into a downstream stage, 
whereas the latter entails backward integration into an upstream stage.
7 A cross in a box 
indicates that this party has the power / authority to decide in unforeseen circumstances 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Hart and Moore, 1990).
8  
                                                 
6 Bolton and Whinston (1993) is most related to this article. They also consider the choice of 
governance structure in a setting with multilateral trading relationships. Their model consists of one 
upstream party and two downstream parties; with some probability, upstream capacity is insufficient 
to satisfy downstream demand. Its main focus is on supply assurance concerns when several 
downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply. 
7 A cooperative is usually conceived of as an organisation consisting of many independent producers / 
consumers jointly owning an enterprise at another stage of production. This seems to be at odds with 
figure 2, where the authority in a cooperative seems to be allocated to either one or two players. 
However, this turns out not to be problematic for the model in this article. It is straightforward to show 
that many identical producers / consumers will always prefer a governance structure in which they are 
united above a governance structure in which they are all independent, ceteris paribus. Countervailing 
power is driving this result. Each box in figure 1 can therefore be thought of as one grower, or as an 
association of many identical growers.   
8 Notice that a few additional governance structures can be distinguished. Two variations on 
governance structure V entail the elimination of one cross. However, this is not very realistic given the 
collective ownership feature of cooperatives.  
A  B 
Growers 




I Market exchange  II Heterogeneuos association 
 
 




V Heterogeneous producer cooperative  VI Heterogeneous consumer cooperative 
     
 
VII High quality consumer cooperative  VIII Low quality consumer cooperative 
 
Figure 2: Eight governance structures 
 
The decision rights characteristics of these eight governance structures are 
summarized in table 1. Residual control and priority access are distinguished. Residual 
control is indicated by a ‘cross’. It entails that this party is allowed to decide in unforeseen 
circumstances, i.e. this party has authority. Priority access of a grower means that the 
wholesaler is not allowed to reject the produce of this grower. The equality principle means 
that the revenues of the growers in a governance structure have to be shared equally between 
all the growers with authority. Notice that the equality principle is always actual when both 
growers have authority, either in one enterprise or in two enterprises. For example, the 
equality principle is present in governance structure I. There is no averaging of payoffs of 
different types of growers, because there is not collective ownership of different types of 
growers. The equality principle in the governance structures II and V entails pooling 
regarding revenues as well as deliveries of different growers. 
   6 



















I  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
II  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
III  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
IV  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes 
V  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
VI  No  No  Yes  No  No 
VII  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
VIII  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 
Table 1: Decision rights in the eight governance structures 
 
The systematic investigation of the interactions between authority, access, and 
countervailing power in the various governance structures is facilitated by translating these 
qualitative features of decision and income rights into quantitative measures. The tool of co-
operative game theory (Hendrikse, 2003) will be adopted for this purpose
9. The feature of the 
model that growers may offer produce of different quality in excess supply to a wholesaler 
will now be made precise. Assume that grower 1 produces one unit with value A and grower 
2 produces one unit with value B (<A). Growers are assumed to take an all or nothing 
decision regarding investment. Define xi as the investment by grower i, where i=1,2. The level 
of investment of grower I is therefore xi = 0 when grower i does not invest and xi = 1 when 
grower i invests. The wholesaler wants to buy only one unit of the product of the growers. It 
is assumed that the wholesaler is essential for the growers to bring their produce to value. 
The characteristic function depends on the choice of governance structure (G) and the 
choice of investment (x) by the growers. Three cases regarding investment are distinguished. 
Consider first the situation where only grower 1 invests. The creation of value requires a 
coalition consisting of of at least the produce of grower 1 and the outlet at the wholesaler 
stage of production. Table 2 presents the characteristic function of the various governance 
structures. For example, all parties are independent in governance structure I. So, the value A 
is only generated when at least grower 1 and the wholesaler are present. It implies that only 
v(13) and v(123) are equal to A. All other coalitions have value 0. Governance structure III 
reflects the situation of forward integration by grower 1 into wholesaling. The only 
requirement for the generation of value A by a coalition is that grower 1 is part of the 
coalition. The change from governance structure I to governance structure III shows the effect 
of increased ownership over assets. 
                                                 
9 A cooperative game is summarised by the characteristic function (N,v), where N is the set of players 
and v specifies a payoff for every possible subset of the set of players.   7 
 
x  G  v(1)  v(2)  v(3)  v(12)  v(13)   v(23)  v(123) 
(1,0)  I  0  0  0  0  A  0  A 
(1,0)  II  0  0  0  0  A  0  A 
(1,0)  III  A  0  0  A  A  0  A 
(1,0)  IV  0  0  0  A  0  0  A 
(1,0)  V  A  0  0  A  A  0  A 
(1,0)  VI  0  0  A  0  A  A  A 
(1,0)  VII  0  0  A  0  A  A  A 
(1,0)  VIII  0  0  0  0  A  0  A 
 
Table 2: Characteristic function form when only grower 1 invests 
 
The second case consists of the situation where only grower 2 invests. Table 3 
presents the characteristic function, which is similar to table 2. 
 
x  G  v(1)  v(2)  v(3)  v(12)  v(13)   v(23)  v(123) 
(0,1)  I  0  0  0  0  0  B  B 
(0,1)  II  0  0  0  0  0  B  B 
(0,1)  III  0  0  0  B  0  0  B 
(0,1)  IV  0  B  0  B  0  B  B 
(0,1)  V  0  B  0  B  0  B  B 
(0,1)  VI  0  0  B  0  B  B  B 
(0,1)  VII  0  0  0  0  0  B  B 
(0,1)  VIII  0  0  B  0  B  B  B 
 
Table 3: Characteristic function form when only grower 2 invests 
 
Table 4 presents the characteristic function for each governance structure when both 
growers invest. Governance structure I shows the effect of excess supply. The wholesaler 
adds value to  the singleton coalitions {1} and {2}, i.e. v(13) and v(23) are positive. The 
difference between v(13) =A and v(23)=B  reflects the heterogeneity between the growers. 
The equality principle regarding revenues as well as delivery shows up in the characteristic 
function of the governance structures II and V. Priority access is illustrated by the difference 
between IV and VIII. Coalition {1, 2} has only value B in governance structure IV, while 
they also have the high quality produce A available. The coalition  {1, 3} has value A in 
governance structure VIII, because the wholesaler has the power.  
 
x  G  v(1)  v(2)  v(3)  v(12)  v(13)   v(23)  v(123) 
(1,1)  I  0  0  0  0  A  B  A 
(1,1)  II  0  0  0  0  (A+B)/4  (A+B)/4  (A+B)/2 
(1,1)  III  A  0  0  A  A  0  A 
(1,1)  IV  0  B  0  B  0  B  B 
(1,1)   V  (A+B)/4  (A+B)/4  0  (A+B)/2  (A+B)/4  (A+B)/4  (A+B)/2 
(1,1)  VI  0  0  A  0  A  A  A 
(1,1)  VII  0  0  A  0  A  A  A 
(1,1)  VIII  0  0  B  0  A  B  A 
 
Table 4: Characteristic function for every governance structure and every investment choice 
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3 Investment incentives 
 
The choice of governance structure and the incentive to invest is analysed with the 
incomplete contracting model of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). It 
consists of a non-cooperative game of two stages: a governance structure stage and an 
investment stage. The choice of governance structure determines the bargaining strength of 
each party in the first stage, while bargaining positions are determined by the choice of the 
level of investment in the second stage. The relationship between the first and the second 
stage is that the allocation of bargaining power (to a player by a governance structure) in the 
first stage determines the incentive to invest in the second stage. 
We follow Hart and Moore (1990) in equating the choice of governance structure to 
the choice of a bargaining power distribution. A standard way to capture the distribution of 
bargaining power is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which is a solution concept in 
cooperative game theory. It consists of a specification of a payoff for each player. The 
Shapley value is determined for each governance structure and each investment decision in 
the tables 2 - 4 and is presented in the tables 5-7. The economic interpretation of the Shapley 
value is that it provides a measure for the intensity of the incentive to invest. Governance 
structures can therefore be ranked in terms of the incentive to invest for each grower. The 
explanation of the ranking of the governance structures will be formulated in terms of the four 
variables in our model: countervailing power, allocation of authority, allocation of priority 
access, and member heterogeneity. 
Table 5 presents the Shapley values belonging to the characteristic functions of table 2. 
If only grower 1 invests, i.e. x = (1,0), then the incentive to invest for grower 1 in the various 
governance structures ranks as: 
 
VI = VII < I = II = IV = VIII < III =V. 
 
The attractiveness of the various governance structures for the wholesaler is: 
 
III = IV = V < I = II = VIII < VI = VII. 
 
The explanation is straightforward. Ownership over assets determines the distribution of 
bargaining power completely. Grower 1 owns all the relevant assets in governance structures 
III and V. The relevant assets are shared between grower 1 and another party in the 
governance structures I, II, IV, and VIII. Finally, grower 1 has no incentive to invest in the 
governance structures VI and VII because these governance structures allocate no assets, and 
therefore no bargaining power, to grower 1. 
 
X  G  Shapley value 
grower 1 




(1,0)  I  A/2  0  A/2 
(1,0)  II  A/2  0  A/2 
(1,0)  III  A  0  0 
(1,0)  IV  A/2  A/2  0 
(1,0)  V  A  0  0 
(1,0)  VI  0  0  A 
(1,0)  VII  0  0  A 
(1,0)  VIII  A/2  0  A/2 
 
Table 5: Shapley values of the eight governance structures when only grower 1 invests 
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Table 6 presents the Shapley values belonging to the characteristic functions of table 3. 
The ranking of governance structures in terms of the incentive to invest for grower 2 when 
only grower 2 invests, i.e. x = (0,1), is: 
 
VI = VIII < I = II = III = VII < IV = V. 
 
The attractiveness of the various governance structures for the wholesaler is: 
 
III = IV = V < I = II = VII < VI = VIII. 
 
The explanation is identical to the explanation of table 5. 
 
X  G  Shapley value 
grower 1 




(0,1)  I  0  B/2  B/2 
(0,1)  II  0  B/2  B/2 
(0,1)  III  B/2  B/2  0 
(0,1)  IV  0  B  0 
(0,1)  V  0  B  0 
(0,1)  VI  0  0  B 
(0,1)  VII  0  B/2  B/2 
(0,1)  VIII  0  0  B 
 
Table 6: Shapley values of the eight governance structures when only grower 2 invests 
 
If both growers have invested, i.e. x = (1,1), then the ranking, and especially the 
explanation of the ranking, of the various governance structures is more involved. It can be 
computed from table 7 that the ranking of governance structures in terms of the intensity to 
invest for grower 1 is: 
 
IV = VI = VII < VIII < I < II < V < III,   when A < 11B/9 
            < VIII < II < I < V < III,   when 11B/9 < A < 5B/3 
            < II < VIII < I < V < III,   when 5B/3 < A < 7B/3 
        < II < VIII < V < I < III,   when 7B/3 < A < 3B 
        < II < V < VIII < I < III,   when 3B < A. 
 
Similar, the ranking of governance structures for grower 2 is: 
 
III = VI = VII = VIII < I < II < V < IV   when A < 3B 
        < II < IV < V    when 3B < A < 7B 
        < IV < II < V    when A > 7B. 
 
Finally, the ranking of the governance structures for the wholesaler is: 
 
III = IV = V <   II < I < VIII < VI = VII    when A < 5B/3 
      II < VIII < I < VI = VII    when 5B/3 < A < 3B 
VIII < II < I < VI = VII    when A > 3B. 
    10 
 
X  G  Shapley value 
grower 1 




(1,1)  I  (3A-2B)/6  B/6  (3A+B)/6 
(1,1)  II  (A+B)/8  (A+B)/8  (A+B)/4 
(1,1)  III  A  0  0 
(1,1)  IV  0  B  0 
(1,1)   V  (A+B)/4  (A+B)/4  0 
(1,1)  VI  0  0  A 
(1,1)  VII  0  0  A 
(1,1)  VIII  (A-B)/2  0  (A+B)/2 
 
Table 7: Shapley values of the eight governance structures when both growers invest 
 
The explanation of the various forces which are involved in the ranking of the eight 
governance structures in terms of the incentive to invest for the growers will be organized 
around authority (3.1), countervailing power versus self-selection (3.2), priority access (3.3), 




One way to determine the impact of ownership over assets is to vary authority, while 
keeping the amount of countervailing power constant. Both growers face stronger incentives 
to invest in governance structure V than in governance structure II.  
Another way of investigating the impact of the control over assets on the incentive to 
invest is by holding the allocation of priority access constant. Observe that there are four 
different allocations of priority access:  
1 Neither grower 1 nor grower 2 has priority access in the governance structures I, II, 
VI, VII, VIII;  
2 Grower 1 has exclusive priority access in governance structure III;  
3 Grower 2 has exclusive priority access in governance structure IV;  
4 Both growers have priority access in governance structure V.  
Governance structures I, II, VI, VII and VIII have the same allocation of priority access, but 
they differ in the allocation of authority. Grower 1 ranks these governance structures as 
 
VI = VII < I, II, VIII. 
 
The value of integration, i.e. authority, is clear. Governance structures VI and VII are worst in 
providing incentives to invest for grower 1 because grower 1 owns no assets. Increased 
ownership of / authority over assets, e.g. I, II and VIII, increases the incentive to invest. 
Similar, governance structures VI and VIII are worst in providing incentives for grower 2 to 
invest because the wholesaler has all the power. 
A final illustration that ownership over more assets increases the incentive to invest is 
the switch from governance structure II to V. Both growers experience a stronger incentive to 
invest. This is due to the fact that power has shifted away from the wholesaler. This is the 
authority effect.  
Notice that the allocation of authority entails an externality in the multilateral setting of 
this article. Grower 1 owns the same amount of assets in governance structure I as well as 
governance structure VIII, but still prefers I above VIII. The reason is that the wholesaler is 
able to create value B on its own in governance structure VIII, whereas this can not be done in 
governance structure I. Ownership of the assets of grower 2 by the wholesaler takes therefore 
some power, i.e. B/6, away from the grower 2 as well as grower 1. Similarly, grower 2 prefers   11 
I above VII, despite owing the same amount of assets, because ownership over more assets by 
the wholesaler imposes a negative externality on grower 2. 
 
3.2 Countervailing power versus self-selection 
 
The impact of member heterogeneity is best illustrated by the Shapley value of 
governance structure I. It captures features of competition as well as bilateral monopoly. 
Suppose there is member heterogeneity, i.e. A = B. Each grower will receive 1/6 of the 
surplus, while the wholesaler receives 2/3. Competition between the growers is beneficial for 
the wholesaler. Increasing member heterogeneity, i.e. the difference between A and B 
becomes positive and is growing, is beneficial for grower 1, but goes at the expense of grower 
2 as well as the wholesaler. If the difference between the growers becomes very large, then 
the market comes close to a bilateral monopoly. Grower 1 and the wholesaler capture each 
half of the surplus, while grower 2 receives nothing.   
The impact of member heterogeneity on the incentive to invest in the various 
governance structures resides in the equality principle, which expresses itself in the forces of 
self-selection and countervailing power. Compare governance structures I and II. A switch 
from governance structure I to governance structure II is beneficial for the investment 
incentive of grower 2, i.e. (A+B)/8 > (B+B)/8 = B/4 > B/6, regardless the extent of member 
heterogeneity (Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002). First, there is the effect of establishing 
countervailing power. The growers are able to capture half of the surplus by switching to 
governance structure II, regardless the extent of member heterogeneity. They have effectively 
turned the market from a competitive situation into a bilateral monopoly. Second, grower 2 
benefits from the equality principle in the heterogeneous association. Grower 2 receives part 
of the surplus which is generated by grower 1. The forces of countervailing power and the 
equality principle on the incentive to invest for grower 1 reinforce each other. 
The effect of a switch from governance structure I to governance structure II on the 
incentive to invest for grower 1 depends on the extent of member heterogeneity. Grower 1 has 
a weaker incentive to invest in governance structure I than in the governance structure II when 
(A/2–B/3) < (A+B)/8, i.e. A < 11B/9. This reflects the situation where member heterogeneity 
is limited. There is a trade-off between two effects: self-selection versus countervailing 
power. The disadvantageous effect of the equality principle for grower 1 in governance 
structure II is not strong enough to eliminate the advantageous effect of countervailing power 
when member heterogeneity is limited. However, if the difference between growers 1 and 2 
becomes larger, then the high quality growers will go for market exchange in order to escape 
the detrimental effect of the equality principle in the heterogeneous association. Governance 
structure V combines the countervailing power and increased ownership over assets in order 
to counter the self-selection effect. This is successful for intermediate values of A, i.e. 11B/9 
< A < 7B/3. The ranking of the governance structures regarding the investment incentive 
intensity for grower 1 is II < I < V. Finally, the self-selection effect dominates the joint forces 
of authority and countervailing power when the difference between grower 1 and 2 is large, 
i.e. II < V < I when A > 7B/3. 
 
3.3 Priority access 
 
The impact of priority access on the incentive to invest is determined by holding the 
allocation of authority constant. Observe that there are five different allocations of authority: 
1 I, II; 2 III, IV, V; 3 VI; 4 VII; 5 VIII. Governance structures III, IV, and V have the same 
allocation of authority, i.e. the Shapley value for the wholesaler is 0 in all three governance 
structures, but they differ in the degree of exclusive priority access. Grower 1 ranks these 
governance structures as 
   12 
IV < V < III. 
 
The incentive to invest  for grower 1 is zero in governance structure IV because it entails 
foreclosure. Governance structure V is more attractive for grower 1 because priority access is 
shared with grower 2. Finally, governance structure III is more attractive than governance 
structure V for grower 1 for three reasons. Grower 1 gains exclusive priority access and the 
equal delivery aspect as well as the equal sharing aspect of the equality principle are 
circumvented. The conclusion is that the strength of the incentive to invest i ncreases for 
grower 1 when the degree of exclusive priority access increases.  
The same result holds for grower 2, but priority access may not be strong to supersede 
countervailing power (and increased ownership). Grower 2 ranks these three governance 
structures as 
 
III < II < V < IV when A < 3B 
III < II < IV < V when 3B < A < 7B 
III < IV < II < V when A > 7B. 
 
The ranking of the low quality producer cooperative IV versus the heterogeneous 
association V depends on the trade-off between exclusive access priority and the equality 
principle. IV is stronger than V when A < 3B, i.e. exclusive access priority is more valuable 
than the equality principle. If 3B < A < 7B, then access priority effect of governance structure 
IV is strong enough to dominate the equality principle and reduced ownership over assets of 
governance structure II, but not strong enough to dominate the equality principle of 
governance structure V. Finally, if A > 7B, then governance structure IV is even worse for 
grower 2 than governance structure II. The huge member heterogeneity gives the equality 
principle in II sufficient force to supersede the attractiveness of priority access and increased 
ownership over assets of IV.  
Notice that a switch from governance structure I to III increases the incentive to invest 
for grower 1 in two ways. First, grower 1 owns more assets. This is reflected in the 
characteristic function by the increase of v(1) from 0 to A. Second, grower 1 has exclusive 
priority access in governance structure III, whereas there is no priority access in governance 
structure I. The switch from I to III forecloses grower 2, i.e. v(23) drops from B to 0. A 
similar result can be stated regarding the incentive to invest for grower 2 when governance 




The comparison of table 7 with the tables 5 and 6 provides various insights regarding 
the effect of oversupply on the incentive to invest in various governance structures. For 
example, grower 2 has no power in governance structures III and VII when both growers 
produce. This is due to the oversupply of inputs and grower 2 producing low quality. 
However, grower 2 captures half of the quasi-surplus when grower 1 is not producing, 
because grower 2 is a monopolist. Another observation regarding grower 2 is that II provides 
stronger incentives to invest than I when x = (1,1), whereas I is equal to II when x = (0,1). 
Governance structure II is not superior to governance structure I in terms of the investment 
incentive for grower 2 because grower 2 does not benefit from the equality principle due to 
grower 1 not producing. A result regarding grower 1 is that governance structure III provides 
stronger incentives to invest than governance structure V for grower 1 when x = (1,1), 
whereas they are equal when x = (1,0). Governance structure V gains in attractiveness for 
grower 1 because there is no competition (from grower 2) and the equality principle has no 
impact, because grower 2 does not produce.  
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4 Equilibrium 
 
So far, the focus has been on the distribution of the revenues of the investments by 
growers 1 and 2, given a certain choice of governance structure. This section addresses the 
equilibrium choice of investment and the equilibrium choice of governance structure. First, 
the investment decision (in the second stage of the game) is determined by taking also the 
costs of investment into account. Define the sunk cost of investment for grower 1 as k1 and 
the sunk cost of investment for grower 2 as k2. The payoff a grower is determined by the 
difference between the Shapley value and sunk costs of that grower. A grower invests when 
this difference is positive. Second, the choice of governance structure, i.e. the first stage of the 
game, is determined. 
 
4.1 Governance structure choice from the perspective of the grower(s) 
 
Assume that grower 1 decides regarding investment before grower 2 decides. Figures 7-
10 in appendix 1 present the extensive form of the game for the various governance 
structures. The relationship between governance structure and incentives can be presented in a 
figure with k1 and k2 on the axes. The subgame perfect investment choices and payoffs for the 
various governance structures are presented in the figures 11-14 in appendix 1.  
 
4.1.1 Feasible governance structure choices 
 
It is immediately clear that the growers will never invest when governance structure VI 
prevails. Neither grower 1 nor grower 2 will ever choose this governance structure. Figure 3 
presents governance structure choices for various values of A and B which are not dominated 
by other governance structures from the perspective of either grower 1 or grower 2 or both. 
(The figures 15-18 in the appendix present some intermediate steps in ranking the various 
governance structures in order to make it easier for the reader to arrive at the figures 19 and 
















































Notice that only the governance structures III, IV and V are feasible from the 
perspective of the growers. They all entail forward vertical integration in order to shift power 
from the wholesaler to the farmer(s). Another conclusion is that these feasible governance 
structure choices entail that there is no oversupply in equilibrium, i.e. the inefficient situation 




Figure 3: Feasible governance structures from the growers’ perspective 





















III: (A – k1, 0) 
IV: (A/2 – k1, A/2) 
IV = V: (0, B – k2) 
III: (B/2, B/2 – k2) 
IV = V: (0, B – k2) 
III: (A – k1, 0) 
IV = V: (0, B –k2)   15 
4.1.2 Efficient governance structure choice 
 
Governance structure is efficient when it generates value equal to max {0, A- k1, B- k2}. 
























Are there efficient governance structure choices which are not feasible? The assumption of no 
investment by the wholesaler simplifies the choice of governance structure when an efficiency 
perspective is taken. Give the wholesaler low incentives, because he does not invest. 
However, not all governance structure choices are efficient. For example, notice that the 
investment by grower 2 is inefficient when k2 > B. This situation of overinvestment may 
occur when A > 3B and either governance structure II or V is actual.  
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The increasing differentiation on the supply side of agricultural and horticultural 
markets has resulted in many governance structure changes between growers and wholesalers. 
For example, growers integrate forward into wholesaling, heterogeneous associations split up 
in various one product associations, marketing co-operatives are restructured, and so on. 
These developments are analysed from a governance perspective with an incomplete 
contracting model addressing horizontal relationships between growers as well as vertical 
relationships between growers and wholesalers is presented. The trade-offs and interaction 
between the horizontal force of countervailing power and the vertical forces of authority and 
access priority in the choice of governance structure are highlighted. 
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